Small firm membership in national trade associations by Wilts, A.S. & Meijer, M.
Journal of Public Affairs
J. Publ. Aff. 5: 176–185 (2005)
Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/pa.12
Small firm membership in national
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* Business associations play a significant role in private–public interactions by aggregating
company interests and relating these to political decision makers. Associations are
particularly important for smaller firms, which generally do not have the resources to
pursue political strategies independently. This paper discusses the question of what the
motives are for small and medium-sized firms to maintain their membership in national
trade associations at a time when the European business environment is undergoing
profound changes. Using the example of the Netherlands, it is argued that associational
membership is determined foremost by political considerations. The implication of this
conclusion is that national business associations continue to perform an important
function inmediating business–government relations. Despite the internationalization of
public decision making, these organizations remain important intermediaries for
corporate public affairs.1
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Introduction
As the development of the European Union
(EU) progresses, corporate political action is
becoming more important for competitive
success in Europe. The build-up of the Single
European Market is creating new opportunities
for companies to gain economic benefits
through influencing political decision making.
Firms may, for example, strive to have trade
barriers removed, thus supporting their market
strategies through political action (Baron,
1995). Alternatively, firms may follow the
opposite goal and support greater political
binding, if that is in line with their business
interests (Weber and Hallerberg, 2001). Poli-
tical strategies are then aimed at establishing or
maintaining barriers in order to prevent
increasing economic competition (Johansson
and Elg, 2002).
The internationalization of public affairs
within the EU produces a greater political
awareness of private companies, and in many
ways stimulates them to engage in forms of
corporate political action. Such action tradi-
tionally is channelled through trade associa-
tions—or business interest associations. These
organizations offer firms a resource base for
pursuing political strategies (Hillman and Hitt,
1999). They are specifically designed to repre-
sent business interests towards third parties
such as government agencies and trade unions.
Because associations mediate the interests of
firms and companies, and speak on behalf of
the business community, they are important
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actors in various systems of interest politics
(Wilts and Quittkat, 2004).
This paper discusses the question of what
the motives are for small and medium-sized
firms to maintain their membership in national
trade associations at a time when the European
business environment is undergoing profound
changes. This is an important question because
there is little empirical evidence available about
the impact of Europeanization on national
arrangements of interest politics (Lehmkuhl,
2000). Most studies have focused on European-
level developments—for example, analysing
the role of large firms in EU policy networks
(Coen, 1997). Yet, the majority of firms,
particularly smaller ones, do not interact
directly with EU institutions. Small and med-
ium-sized companies necessarily rely on col-
lective forms of business action when
approaching their public policy environment
(Cook and Barry, 1995). This means that
questions of the associability between firms
and of the conditions for collective action
within industries at national level are of central
concern to understanding changes in the
European business system and their conse-
quences for corporate public affairs.
This paper presents data that indicate that
national sectoral associations continue to
provide an important resource base for corpo-
rate political action, particularly for small and
medium-sized firms. It is argued that these firms
maintain their membership in national trade
associations to acquire information about the
public policy process and as a way to interact
with political institutions. That is, in the case of
national sectoral associations, in contrast to
large, inter-sectoral ones (Jordan and Halpin,
2003), selective benefits seem to be less
important than collective considerations for
firms to maintain their membership in business
interest organizations. Therefore, so the paper
argues, despite the ongoing internationaliza-
tion of the European business system, national
associations have not lost their function in
organizing collective business action towards
the policy process. These associations remain
important intermediaries for corporate public
affairs.
In order to set out its argument, the paper
subsequently discusses the characteristics of
associational systems, addresses empirical
developments within national business asso-
ciations and—using the example of the
Netherlands—presents the results of a survey
among the membership of a number of these
organizations. In conclusion, the paper speci-
fies three questions for further research that
follow from the analysis of the survey results,
and which are of both academic and practical
interest.
Business interests in the EU
The way in which business interests are
brought to bear on political decision making
is profoundly complicated by the develop-
ment of the EU. EU policies emerge in a multi-
level governance system characterized by
complex interactions between local and
national governments, heterogeneous sets of
interest groups and a great number of
different EU agencies (Falkner, 2000). Given
the fragmented character of the EU bureau-
cracy and the often untransparent nature of its
decision-making process, it is very difficult for
firms to establish contacts through which
they can noticeably influence political deci-
sion making (Saurugger, 2001). Because there
are many entry points to the EU decision-
making process, access may be easy to
achieve but actual influence difficult to
demonstrate (Beyers, 2004).
The development of EU policy arrangements
meant the emergence of new structures in
business–government relations, adding a supra-
national layer of interest politics and affecting
the functioning of business associations in
the member states (Greenwood, 1997). At
European level, firms and their representatives
must act as private interest groups, and in doing
so have to compete with other groups for
access to the EU institutions (Bouwen, 2002).
The EU system, therefore, requires other
than very large firms to join forces and try
to act collectively towards the EU bure-
aucracy. For this reason, questions of associa-
bility are of central concern for understanding
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developments in business–government rela-
tions in a European context.
Firms that try to articulate their interests
towards the EU decision-making system are
faced with the management question of how to
devise effective political strategies and inte-
grate these with their market activities
(Rehbein and Schuler, 1999). To overcome this
problem, large firms may establish specialist
lobbying departments in Brussels and allocate
considerable resources to their integration in
the company’s management structure. Exam-
ples are multinational corporations in the car
and oil industry (Taminiau, 2001), chemicals
and pharmaceuticals. Companies such as BP,
Volkswagen and Akzo Nobel have a self-evident
interest in maintaining a clear EU presence.
Because of their economic importance, leading
European firms are able to maintain very close
contacts with high levels of the EU bureau-
cracy, and in many ways have become an
integrated part of the EU policy network (Coen,
1997). Small and medium-sized firms, however,
generally do not have the resources to pursue
political strategies at EU level and are more
likely to act collectively to bring their interests
to bear on political decision making (Hillman
and Hitt, 1999).
Business associations play an important role
in aggregating company interests and relating
these to political decision makers (Figure 1).
Associations coordinate collective business
action by bringing firms in contact with their
competitors, supplying information to them
and helping them to recognize what exactly
their political interests are. On the intermediate
level, associations organize collective business
action by coordinating the political actions of
firms, aggregating their interests and building
coalitions and alliances with other associations
or large firms that have the resources to pursue
political strategies of their own (Bennett,
1997a). At the political decision-making level,
business associations need to become part of
policy networks in order to realize influence.
Achieving privileged access to political
decision making requires associations to adopt
an insider style, operating according to the
parameters set within a certain policy commu-
nity. This may enforce the professionalization
of the management of associations and could
produce significant tensions between the
need to realize influence on political decision
making on the one hand and the need to
continue to meet membership demand on the
other (Jordan and Halpin, 2003). The more
associations are involved in policy networks,
therefore, the more difficult it becomes to
balance the logics of influence and member-
ship that structure their functioning as collec-
tive interest organizations (Schmitter and
Streeck, 1999). This holds, in particular, for
larger associations that organize interests
across industries or sectors (Jordan and Halpin,
2003). Smaller, single-industry associations can
more easily organize their constituencies
Level of policy decision making and the functioning of policy networks
Intermediate level of interest formation and collective business action
Level of competitive relations and conflicts of interest between firms
Aggregation Coordination
Legitimation Participation
Figure 1. Exchange relations between three levels in associational systems.
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Journal of Public Affairs, May 2005
178 Arnold Wilts and Marloes Meyer
(Olson, 1965). In these smaller associations,
there is less tension between the task to
represent collective interests and the need to
meet individual membership demand than in
larger, inter-sectoral associations in which
collective business action is more difficult to
organize.
A similar dynamic occurs when associations
try to become part of EU policy networks.
Engaging in European activities, such as by
direct lobbying or through membership in EU
peak federations, requires associations to
keep up the resources necessary for repre-
sentational activities in both the national and
the European arena. Many national business
associations are too small to be able to become
active European players on their own. Most
associations need to join forces and associate
themselves in European trade federations
(Greenwood, 1997). These national associa-
tions, therefore, are faced with a double
tension between the need to realize political
influence and the need to meet membership
demand for information and representation
(Barnett et al., 2000). That is, national
associations are arenas for both aggregating
interests and organizing collective business
action and actors who, at a higher level of
interest aggregation, are engaging in collec-
tive action themselves.
In this paper, the focus is on small-firm
membership in national trade associations and
the conditions for collective business action at
the basis of the associational system. Associa-
tional membership is voluntary and firms will
exit the organization unless the benefits of
membership outweigh its costs (Schmitter and
Streeck, 1999). This puts pressure on the
functioning of associations. A substantial loss
of members or the loss of certain membership
groups would affect the comprehensiveness of
associations, eventually eroding the resource
base of these organizations and, in the long run,
undermining their legitimacy as the collective
voice of business interests (Van Waarden,
1995). Associations can counteract this by
continuing to meet membership demand for
representation and information, thereby balan-
cing the logics of influence and membership
that structure their functioning. Firms, then,
will be motivated to maintain their association
membership under two general conditions.
First, they will have to value the way in which
their association represents their collective
interests. Secondly, firms will have to approve
of the way in which associations support their
individual performance.
Membership incentives
Following the economic and political changes
in Europe in recent years, business associations
in the member states have come under
pressure to review established ways of interest
representation and to reassess the significance
of the national contacts and affiliations
through which they traditionally represent
their members’ interests (Lehmkuhl, 2000).
This can be observed empirically throughout
the EU, for example in its three largest
members France (Quittkat, 2002), Germany
and the UK (Bennett, 1997b), but also in
smaller countries such as Spain or Austria
(Vatta, 1999).
Business associations are introducing new
information tools, while diversifying the way in
which they meet membership demand. This
can be observed in countries such as Denmark,
where the Confederation of Danish Industries
supports the international activities of Danish
firms through its division for international
business development; Ireland, where the
leading association IBEC offers management
consultancy and legal aid; or the UK, where the
Confederation of British Industry offers best
practice tools and forms of management sup-
port. Examples from below the inter-sectoral
level abound as well. In the Netherlands,
associations in such diverse sectors as trans-
port, road haulage, chemicals and agriculture
have established separate divisions for manage-
ment support and consultancy. Organizational
changes such as these enable the establishment
of new forms of cooperation with the member-
ship. Through its consultancy division, the
main association in the Dutch chemicals sector
VNCI, for example, cooperates with the
knowledge centres of large companies such
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Journal of Public Affairs, May 2005
Small firm membership 179
as DSM and Akzo Nobel—companies which
are themselves active EU lobbyists.
In addition to addressing individual informa-
tion needs and management questions, associa-
tions are increasingly able to offer their
members direct economic benefits. As associa-
tions often represent the largest part of the
companies in their respective sectors, they
become commercially interesting for suppliers
and financial organizations such as credit card
companies. In liaison with commercial service
providers, business associations can offer their
membership, for example, discounts on sector-
specific purchases or credit transactions. This
opens up the opportunity for associations to
develop ways of making membership in the
associations financially interesting. This means
that associations themselves may differ in
entrepreneurial success, as shown by differ-
ences in the development of advanced com-
munication channels, new services and
selective membership incentives through spe-
cial benefits (Grant, 2001).
Arguably, these developments reflect a
gradual change in the functioning of national
trade associations. In addition to established
forms of collective interest representation,
many of these organizations now offer indivi-
dualized and, at times, retributive services to
their members. Realizing selective member-
ship incentives is a way of binding members,
especially when the potential membership of
an association considers collective purposes to
be less relevant (Jordan and Halpin, 2003).
However, this may not be the case in smaller,
sectoral or single-industry associations that can
more easily organize collective business action
(Olson, 1965). The empirical question, there-
fore, is, what are the motives of firms to
maintain their association membership?
The example of The Netherlands
Dutch companies traditionally have been well
organized and most tend to be a member in one
or more business associations (Visser, 1992).
The interests of the Dutch business community
today are represented by well over 800 national
business associations—not counting regional
associations, chambers of commerce and
bodies under public law (Schmidt et al.,
2003). That is, Dutch companies, although
operating in an open economy and in geogra-
phical and political proximity to Brussels,
choose to maintain their membership in
established business interest associations.
To learn more about the motives for firm
membership in national trade associations, a
mail survey was sent out to a selected number
of Dutch companies. The sample for the survey
was formed by the membership of eight small
associations in the manufacturing sector.2 At
the time of the survey, the membership of
these associations varied from 20 to 179. In
December 2002, the questionnaire was sent
out to 460 companies. A total of 103 companies
sent back the completed questionnaire. This
represents a response rate of 22%. Two-thirds
of the respondents are smaller companies,
employing no more than 50 personnel. With
few exceptions, respondents employ no more
than 100 workers. Only 6% are large compa-
nies, employing more than 500. In terms of
their annual turnover, almost half of the
respondents indicated to have an annual turn-
over of less than s10m. The respondents,
therefore, are predominantly small and med-
ium-sized firms.
A mail survey is an adequate instrument for
obtaining empirical information about the
reasons for firms to maintain their associational
membership. However, given the nature of a
survey, the results need to be interpreted
carefully. Moreover, given the specificity of
national systems of interest politics, research
results from the Netherlands cannot be general-
ized without caution. However, the survey
results do provide empirically grounded insight
into the conditions for firm associability. In
presenting the survey data, this paper contri-
butes to making empirical evidence available
2Association of Dutch Brick Manufacturers; Dutch Precast
Concrete Manufacturers Association; Dutch Association
for the Water Treatment Industry; Association of Produ-
cers of Bakery Products; Association of the Dutch Meat
Industry; Association of Coffee Roasters and Tea Packers
in the Netherlands; Dutch Association of Soap Manufac-
turers; Association of Dutch Waste Companies.
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Journal of Public Affairs, May 2005
180 Arnold Wilts and Marloes Meyer
concerning the impact of Europeanization on
national systems of interest politics. This will
therefore help to raise questions for further
research into the dynamics of change in
organized business interests and their rele-
vance to corporate public affairs.
The respondents in the survey were smaller
firms, which generally do not manifest them-
selves at EU level and which, as a consequence,
are often overlooked in studies of business–
government interactions in Europe. Theoreti-
cally, there are two general motives for these
firms to become members of trade associations.
Companies can try to exert influence on
political developments by joining forces with
their competitors and engaging in collective
business action. Alternatively, firms may join an
association to help to improve their individual
performance by drawing on the expertise and
information being offered by the association.
Empirically, firms will be motivated both by
collective and individual considerations. To
establish the extent to which these two
motives underlie the association membership
of small firms, respondents were asked to
indicate why they are members of their
respective trade associations.
The survey found that more than 80% of the
respondents claimed that considerations of
collective interest representation are the most
important motive for association membership
(Figure 2). The second most often mentioned
motive was having the opportunity to influence
political decision making. Individual motives,
such as information needs and individual
support, were not mentioned as often by the
respondents. The associations’ expertise in
negotiating collective wage agreements with
trade unions was considered to be an important
motive for membership by less than half of the
respondents. These findings suggest that for
small firms, membership in national trade
associations indeed constitutes a channel for
collective business action towards the policy
process, as suggested in the literature (Cook
and Barry, 1995).
The survey results indicated that—from the
perspective of small and medium-sized firms—
national associations are an important arena for
collective business action towards the policy
decision-making process. It seems that associa-
tions have not lost this function following the
internationalization of economic and public
affairs in Europe in recent years. A possible
explanation for this, already referred to earlier
in this paper, is that the trade associations
included in the survey generally draw their
membership from a relatively small, industry-
specific constituency. The small scale of
associations, the possibility of direct contacts
with large parts of an industry and the visibility
among competitors stimulate the emergence
of collective business action (Olson, 1965).
This is reflected by the data, which indicate
that, for smaller firms, considerations of
interest representation and collective action
0 20 40 60 80 100
Collective interest representation
Influencing political decision making
Acquiring information and expertise
Involvement in collective bargaining
Stimulating market development
Supporting labour market policies
Figure 2. Motives for associational membership.
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are more prominent motives for maintaining
associational membership than the inform-
ation supply of the associations and the support
of individual firm performance. This explana-
tion suggests that the conditions for firm
associability differ across industries—and
may, indeed, be more difficult to achieve in
large, inter-sectoral associations (Jordan and
Halpin, 2003). The survey results thus point to
the question of the extent to which institu-
tional features of industries and organizational
characteristics of firms and associations
together structure firm associability.
Given their role in associational systems,
national business associations are important
information intermediaries. According to the
survey, providing information to the member-
ship runs parallel to the political activities of
associations. A majority of 69% of the respon-
dents indicated that the most important infor-
mation received through their membership
concerns new legislation. This is often in regard
to the implementation of European regulations
and their consequences—such as regulations
on the terrain of labour law and environmental
policy. Marketing information from the associa-
tions generally was considered to be less
relevant by the respondents, and consultancy
and financial discounts were mentioned less
frequently as being important.
These findings suggest that selective mem-
bership incentives such as financial benefits are
not particularly important to the decision by
small and medium-sized firms to maintain their
associational membership. An explanation for
this suggested by the literature is that managers
from smaller firms are more likely to use
association membership as a way to gain
information about the European political sys-
tem and the implications of EU regulations
(Hadjikhani and Ghauri, 2001). That is, man-
agers and public affairs officials in smaller firms
are likely to see association membership in
political terms, related to the representation of
firms’ interests. Managers can have a significant
impact upon the political behaviour of small
firms (Cook and Barry, 1993). The survey
results thus point to the question of the role
that the political outlook of managers and
public affairs officials plays in decisions by
smaller firms to engage in forms of collective
business action.
The survey further aimed to gain insight
into the respondents’ assessment of their
association’s functioning. This was done by
asking respondents their opinions on a total of
35 propositions. These propositions were
grouped around five general themes, such as
the general assessment of collective interest
representation, the associations’ expertise in
reaching collective wage agreements and the
quality of the information being offered.
Again, collective interest representation was
most often mentioned in a positive way by the
respondents (Figure 3). Most firms—almost
two-thirds—are positive about their associa-
tions’ representation of collective interests,
identified earlier as the most important motive
for being a member. These firms positively
value the conditions for collective business
0 20        40        60        80 100
Collective interest representation
Supplying information and expertise
Supporting labour policies 
Conducting collective bargaining
Providing organisational advice
Figure 3. Assessment of associations’ activities.
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action realized through association member-
ship. A very large majority of 90% of the
respondents indicated that they will continue
their association membership in the near future
and are not thinking of using their exit option.
In addition, two-thirds of the respondents
indicated that they are prepared to voice their
interests when they feel that their association is
not functioning properly, while 60% actively
participate in work committees and association
meetings. These firms are important stake-
holders in their associations, joining forces
with competitors through their membership
and engaging in collective business action
towards the policy process. For these compa-
nies, national business associations perform an
important function by offering a resource base
for political action, serving as intermediaries for
corporate public affairs.
The survey results suggest that association
members have a relatively strong sense of
organizational loyalty. This can partly be
explained by the importance of routine and
stability in the Dutch system of interest politics,
where existing corporatist structures allow
firms to be part of the public policy process
through collective bodies, such as trade asso-
ciations (Visser and Wilts, 2005). Therefore, in
the situation of The Netherlands, association
membership can indeed serve the political
interests of firms. An additional explanation
suggested by the literature is that for most firms
there is no viable alternative to association
membership, other than to ‘go it alone’ and
interact with the policy process independently
(Cook and Barry, 1995). In other words, for
many firms, exit is not an option and this
induces loyalty while reducing the relative
costs of voice (Hirschman, 1970). Membership
of EU associations, for example, does not
appear to be an alternative that would create
exit options and change the dynamic of
membership within national associations.
The survey shows that, despite the inter-
nationalization of public decision making,
many firms remain orientated towards nation-
ally operating business interest organizations.
The empirical outcomes of the survey support
the argument that national structures mediate
the impact of Europeanization processes on the
political behaviour of firms and organized
interests (Lehmkuhl, 2000). Therefore, an
important question for further research is
how firm associability is institutionally
embedded within national systems of interest
politics and how this embeddedness structures
their responses to the internationalization of
economic and political affairs.
Conclusion
The data presented here suggest that political
considerations remain paramount to the
decision by smaller firms to maintain their
membership in national trade associations.
The respondents in the survey indicated that
they primarily see their association as repre-
senting collective business interests and that
this is a main motive for them to maintain their
membership. Because the scope of the survey
presented in this paper was relatively limited,
these observations cannot be generalized as
such. However, the interpretation of the
survey results did suggest a number of
plausible explanations for the lasting orienta-
tion of firms towards nationally operating
business interest organizations. Institutional
features of industries, the role of public affairs
officials within companies and the structures
of national systems of interest politics were
highlighted.
The survey data raise three basic questions
for further research into firm associability. It
was suggested that smaller, single-industry
associations experience less tension between
collective interest representation and the
need to meet individual membership demand.
The survey results, therefore, point to the
question of how institutional features of
industries and organizational characteristics
of firms and trade associations are structuring
factors in firm associability. This is a relevant
research question because there is very little
empirical evidence available concerning
these institutional conditions at the bottom
of the associational system. Yet, these condi-
tions are important for corporate public
affairs while they structure the effectiveness
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of different—individual and collective—stra-
tegies through which firms can represent
their policy interests.
Given the potential impact of individual
managers on the strategies of small firms, the
second question that followed from the analy-
sis of the survey results concerns the role
played by the political outlook of public affairs
officials in decisions by firms to associate
themselves and engage in collective forms of
business action. Again, this is an important
aspect of firm associability that has received
little attention in the literature, as most studies
focus on large companies and their representa-
tives, which are able to interact directly with
high levels of government bureaucracies and
political institutions. Finally, the third issue
identified in the paper as an important question
for further research concerns the embedded-
ness of firm associability in national structures
of interest politics. The survey presented here
supports the argument that, despite the inter-
nationalization of economic and political affairs
in Europe, national trade associations remain
an important channel for corporate political
action. These organizations continue to per-
form an important function in mediating
business–government relations, aggregating
business interests and coordinating the politi-
cal activities of firms.
The main conclusion of this paper, then, is
that associations remain important intermedi-
aries for corporate public affairs, despite the
ongoing internationalization of public policy
processes. Secondly, the analysis of the results
presented here suggests that national associa-
tions will continue to have a steady member-
ship base, provided that they can demonstrate
the effectiveness of their strategies towards a
policy decision-making process that is becom-
ing increasingly complex as the EU develops
further. Although these developments occur
rapidly, there is much stability at the bottom of
the associational system, and any changes can
necessarily follow only in a path-dependent
manner. An increasing orientation towards
European issues and developments should not
divert attention away from this basic dimension
of corporate public affairs.
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